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Introduction 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984), has become 
one of the most frequently cited cases in American administrative law (Merrill, 1992). In 
the case of Chevron the Court specified what standard of review courts should apply 
when reviewing a government agency's reading of a statue. The result was the Court's 
development of a two-step analysis, called the Chevron Two-Step. 
This test is what makes Chevron of particular interest and why it is so important 
to the field of administrative law. The case's analysis is the most clear articulation of the 
Doctrine of Deference - the notion that courts should defer to agencies' expertise and 
their need for flexibility — to the point that the Court has used the phrase "Chevron 
deference" in more recent cases (533 U.S. 218). 
In his written opinion, Justice Stevens established a two-part test courts should 
employ when reviewing an agency's interpretation of Congressional statute. 
1. A reviewing court must determine whether Congress has spoken directly 
to the question at hand or it their intent is ambiguous. 
If Congress was clear in its direction, all that is left is to determine whether the agency 
complied with Congress's will. However, if they were not clear the court then moves to 
step two, which, as Stevens explains, states that: 
2. If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific question, the court must 
defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute. The court can only 
overturn an agency's interpretation if it deems the agency has acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in their construction of the statute. 
H67 U.S. 837. 
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Although Chevron v. NRDC is one of the most widely cited decisions rendered 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, it may be the case that lower courts still refuse to give 
agencies the degree of deference Chevron demands. Some observers believe it to be a 
"revolution on paper" only and therefore less important than using the traditional 
contextual models of judicial decision-making (Kerr 1998, 1). Notably, Orin Kerr (1998) 
examined applications of the Chevron Doctrine in United States Court of Appealsand 
found that judges applied Chevron selectively; that is, Republican-appointed judges were 
more likely accept agencies' interpretations when doing so leads to conservative 
outcomes and rejecting agencies' interpretation when doing so would lead to a liberal 
outcome. Democratic-appointed judges similarly employed Chevron in a liberal way. 
Hence Chevron's true impact is muted by the political ideology of judges tasked with the 
case's application. 
This thesis builds from Kerr's work. It is provides an updated view of the court 
system by combining Kerr's models with two other models widely used to explain 
judicial decision-making. Using these models, I am able to design an empirical study that 
can help to explain why judges make the decisions that they do. This could in turn, help 
to explain the broader dynamics of judicial decision-making, rather than only identifying 
the role of Chevron as Kerr's article does. 
To do this, I examined cases that applied Chevron in the years 2008 and 2009. 
Each case comes from the United States district courts located in the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. District courts located in the Ninth Circuit were chosen because the Ninth 
Circuit is the largest, and its district courts had the most Chevron citations when 
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compared to district courts in other circuits. I limited my analysis to the district courts of 
only one circuit. This was done to avoid any intercircuit variations in Chevron's 
application. 
In the following section, I will discuss the literature developed by political 
scientists that explains how judges make their decisions. In the section after that, I 
discuss Orin Kerr's article and how Chevron can be tested using three distinct models 
that were developed when attempting to explain why judges apply precedents the way 
that they do. To conduct this study, a Lexis/Nexis search was conducted of cases that 
were decided by U.S. District Courts in the Ninth Circuit that used the Chevron test on an 
agency's interpretation of statute. Six hypotheses were developed and each one tested 
Chevron in a separate way, each examining different potential explanations behind 
Chevron's application. My findings, after testing these hypotheses, show that none of 
them are correct. Judges tend to apply Chevron, not to further policy agendas, or to act 
strategically, but instead because the precedent is applicable to the case at hand. 
Explaining Judicial Decision-Making 
For fifty years, political scientists have been exploring how judges behave and 
why they reach the decisions they do. Today there are four main models that attempt to 
explain why judges reach the decisions they do: the attitudinal model, strategic new 
institutionalism, constitutive new institutionalism, and role theory. Although they seek to 
explain how judges reach their decisions, each model asks different questions, and each 
affects how scholars view the judiciary in a very important way. While strategic new 
institutionalism and role theory do not fall within the scope of my study, they are both 
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mentioned so that the reader may have a full understanding of the theories scholars deem 
the most important in explaining judicial decision-making. 
The Attitudinal Model 
The first of these models is the attitudinal model. A melding of concepts from 
political science, economics, legal realism, and psychology, this model holds that 
Supreme Court justices vote the way they do because of the ideological attitudes and their 
values (Segal and Spaeth, 2002). In other words, a justice votes the way that he or she 
does because they lean more towards the conservative or liberal side of the ideology scale. 
Herman Pritchett (1948) was the first to conduct an empirical assessment of the 
Supreme Court by examining patterns in the Roosevelt Court. In his book, Pritchett is 
able to place justices on a "left-right" ideological scale, based on their votes on cases that 
came before the Court. Specifically, certain justices would consistently vote in a liberal 
bloc, others in a conservative bloc. The most important contribution from Pritchett's 
study, however, is that this book, in part, proves that judges are not mechanically 
applying the law but instead rendering decisions that are consistently influenced by their 
own personal political preferences. 
The next major study written, on the subject of judicial decision-making, was 
written by Glendon Schubert (1965). While his findingsconfirmed Pritchett's main 
findings, there was one major issue that Schubert was able to bring into the light. 
Schubert showed that judges did not always line up in a neat ideological row on a 
political spectrum. Instead, in some cases, two justices would be on opposite ends of 
Pritchett's spectrum, but on others, they would line up next to each other and vote the 
same way. This confounded Pritchett's model. Thus, two justices who usually vote 
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together on cases dealing with civil liberties would find themselves on opposite sides on 
cases that dealt with the issue of judicial power. Schubert showed that when different 
types of cases were examined, there were voting patterns that emerged, whereas, if 
Pritchett's model was followed the results would be less predictable. 
The results of this study were confirmed by Rohde and Spaeth (1976) and Segal 
and Spaeth (2002) and became known as the attitudinal model. Segal and Spaeth (2002), 
in their updated work, explain that this model, in its pure form, applies most plausibly to 
the decision on the merits. They explain that attitudes are a crucial factor when shaping a 
decision, but not the only factor. Rather, this model holds that case stimuli, the facts of 
the case and what it is about, are contrasted against attitudes when trying to determine 
how a particular justice reaches a decision. Segal and Spaeth, took their research a step 
further in their attempt to explain how a justice makes the decisions they do. 
However, not all judicial politics researchers find the models' findings compelling 
and are critical of how much it actually explains. While no one discounts the fact that 
these studies have provided insight into judicial decision-making, they still point out 
someof the attitudinal models flaws. Charles Sheldon (1974) is one such person. His 
pointed out that these studies focus primarily on the Supreme Court and virtually ignore 
the lower courts. While the Supreme Court's word is final, the fact that they hear less 
than one percent of cases shows that lower courts make precedent-setting decisions on a 
much larger scale and therefore cannot be ignored because of the shear amount of cases 
they decide every day. Thus, as Sheldon explains, a large gap is left in our knowledge of 
the judicial process. 
5 
Richard Baum (1994) and Jack Knight (1994) are also critical of this model. 
Baum believes that Segal and Spaeth employ the wrong evidence in support of their main 
argument. He explains that it is erroneous to believe that personal policy preferences are 
the only variable that influences decision-making. The very fact that they did not include 
the application of the law, into the justice's decision-making process is proof enough that 
the argument lacks validity. After all, even if a judge makes a decision based on his or 
her personal preferences, this does not mean that they completely set aside the law when 
handing down a decision. Baum also states that the evidence provided does not prove that 
a justice consistently votes to support certain policy preferences because of their own 
policy preferences. 
Knight (1994), on the other hand, criticizes the model for what is not explained. 
He states that that attitudinal model fails to account for factors that would complicate a 
justice's vote and the effectuation of a particular outcome, such as why some cases are 
said to be meritless while others are not. Cornell Clayton (1999) continues with this 
argument by stating that attitudinalists give a false construction to other models, such as 
the legal model, which posits legal material, such as the Constitution, case law, legal 
doctrines, or federal statutes, determine the outcome of a case. Their attempt to create a 
straw man out of the legal model is one of the largest failings because it ignores the fact 
that the model is meant to be used as a model that can go hand in hand with the 
attitudinal model rather than work against it. 
Ultimately, while the attitudinal model provides some insight into the dynamics of 
judicial decision-making, there is more that has yet to be explained. This is especially 
true when examining the decisions of the lower district and circuit courts. Since the 
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attitudinal model fails to explain how these judges make decisions, there is a whole world 
of judicial decision-making left to discover. 
Strategic New Institutionalism 
New Institutionalism attempts to explain the constraints on judicial decision-
making that the attitudinal model left out. Though, Supreme Court justices are much 
more free to do as they please when it comes to judicial decision-making, more recent 
scholars (Hall and Brace 1992; Brace and Hall 1993; Wahlbeck 1997) have tried to 
explain the institutional constraints by which judges of the lower courts are bound. 
The work of March and Olsen (1983, 1989) had the most impact and are the ones 
that inspired later scholars, in this field. They explain that routines, convention, 
strategies, and technologies are what affect political behavior and this is what later 
scholars have attempted to examine and explain. Their work was influential with judicial 
politics scholars because many concluded institutions could better explain all of the 
nuances involved in the role of the judiciary than simple political preferences. 
A main difference between the attitudinal and the new institutional approaches 
has to do with the role played by precedents and public and elite opinions. Adherents to 
the attitudinal model believe that these are factors that cannot be explained (or at least 
adequately measured) and therefore, cannot be understood when applying them to a 
Supreme Court justice (Clayton, 1999). The Court assents that such variables (i.e. 
precedents and public opinion) are crucial when it comes to explaining how a judge 
behaves when handing down a ruling from the bench. In other words, if public opinion 
were against a certain outcome, this would hold more weight in a judge's mind and could 
cause them to rule in the way that the public prefers. 
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Strategic new institutionalism is one of the theories presented that was part of the 
reemergence of institutional analysis. Like the attitudinal model, it holds that judges have 
political preferences, but are largely constrained by the institution from acting on those 
preferences. Along these lines, Hall and Brace (1999) explain how judges behave under 
the constraints of the institutional system. There are three main reasons that a judge 
would prefer to act strategically while in office, though one, will be explained later. One 
reason is that judges have ambition for higher office and will do what must be done to 
attain it. According to Schlesinger (1966), most judges should have ambitions to obtain a 
higher office for ambition lies at the heart of politics. Those who sit on the Supreme 
Court are no different than any other political player. The second reason is that a judge 
pursues goals, in a strategic manner in response to institutional and contextual 
arrangements. Their findings, when stated plainly, explain that it does not make sense to 
ignore the importance of institutions or to construct theories of decision-making that 
apply to only one court. 
These findings corroborate what previous studies have already found, that judges 
do act strategically and within the constraints of their institution. Hall and Brace have 
done a remarkable amount of work in this area and their earlier works, especially in the 
area of dissent writing and have helped give a significant understanding of the strategic 
argument. Hall and Brace (1989) first examined this topic from the state supreme court 
level. They found that court-specific characteristics, such as how the judge attained their 
seat and the ease of being removed from office, do in fact affect the number of dissents 
written. Furthermore, Hall and Brace's series of studies on dissents (see Brace and Hall 
1993, 1997; Hall and Brace 1992, 1996) in state courts found that a liberal judge, up for 
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election would be much less likely to dissent in conservative states. This is because they 
realize they could be removed from office and believe that keeping their seat was more 
important than whatever dissent they wanted to write. 
It should be noted that evidence supporting the strategic new institutionalism 
model has come from studies, not only in state courts, but in the U.S. Supreme Court, as 
well. These various studies have shown that variables such as the preference of the 
president and the number of amicus briefs filed, among other factors, can change how a 
justice votes (see Wahlbeck 1997, 1998). Thus proving that even the men and women of 
the high court can be influenced by institutional factors as well. 
Constitutive New Institutionalism 
Another model that seeks to explain the decisions and behavior of judges is 
constitutive new institutionalism. It looks at how institutions affect judicial behavior 
rather than how these institutions constrain them. Gillman (1999) explains where the 
strategic new institutionalism point fails however. He argues that using the strategic 
approach can only help shed light on the institutional features that are, in fact, purely 
strategic. This is a problem because it leaves a whole spectrum of judicial decision-
making unexplored. 
Kahn (1994) argues that justices have an obligation that helps guide their judicial 
behavior. Rather than political preferences or strategic objectives, he argues, that it is a 
sense of obligation directed by legal norms that guide the way in which they make their 
decisions. He explains that despite the fact that different courts have different members 
with different political beliefs, they will uphold the same precedents. They do this, 
because, though the members may have differing philosophical beliefs, they all view the 
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court as a countermajoritarian legal institution and share a sense of correctness for the 
Court and the law. 
This theory focuses on legal interpretation and how a judge explains the law and 
the Constitution. Gillman (1994, 1999) takes this a step further by looking at how 
traditions in Constitutional law began. He finds that judges before the 19th century 
developed a uniform body of rules, based on the Constitution, which stated what 
legislative bodies, could and could not do. However, in the 19th century the judiciary, 
because of industrialization and progressive reformers, began to define liberties more 
broadly rather than sticking to what was clearly defined by their predecessors. Their 
reasoning behind this was so they could promote the expansion of government power,of 
which the judiciary approved. However, in the next century these judges began using a 
more interpretivist rationale as it helped them to better protect individual rights. They do 
this by attempting to reconstruct states of mind as well as political contexts in order to 
better understand what led a particular person to adopt a specific course of conduct. 
Gillman (1999) further discusses the idea of the interpretivists and how they view 
decision-making. He explains that this group is frustrated with the prevailing theory that 
judges only involve themselves in the legal process in order to manipulate the rules in the 
interest furthering their political attitudes. While this group believes that politics are part 
of jurisprudence, they prevail upon scholars to look at other explanations. For example, 
interpretivists believe that a judge views the law, not as a strategic game, but instead as a 
reflection of their deepest convictions. Thus, Kahn (1994) states that justices uphold 
precedent simply because they believe in basing decisions on those Constitutional 
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principles that have been previously established in precedent rather than for agenda 
setting purposes. 
Gillman views constitutive new institutionalism as a mission and argues that rather 
than focusing on a judge being selfish and making a rule based on their own preferences, 
this theory instead tries to reconstruct a state of mind or political context in order to 
explain why a particular judge made a particular ruling. Thus, Gillman argues that 
perhaps it would be best to go back to the theoretical frameworks and integrate them into 
the prevailing constitutive models of today. 
Unfortunately, this model can only explain so much. While the model points a 
researcher towards the reason a judge makes a particular decision, ultimately it does not 
answer why they do. This is one reason that Tamanaha (1996) was critical of the 
interpretivist model. He argues that, while this model take a look at the internal 
viewpoint of a judge and how they feel about a particular case, it fails to explain why 
they are applying these viewpoints the way that they are. 
Role Theory 
Role theory could be the one that helps explain the questions left behind by 
constitutive new institutionalism. This theory is well developed and much older than the 
one previously mentioned and actually comes from the study of legislators (Wahlke et al, 
1962). James Gibson (1978) argued that the ideas of roles were not understood, as they 
should be, despite the fact that they are important predictors of behavior. 
At the same time that Gibson began his studies, Woodford Howard (1977) also 
looked at the idea of judicial roles among federal circuit judges. According to this study, 
a judicial role is what a judge believes how their work should be performed. What he 
11 
finds is that when it comes to decision-making, whether a judge is a realist, an innovator, 
or an interpreter (i.e. their role conceptions), were slightly influential, but not the most 
significant factors in the decision-making process. Each type has a particular view of 
how justice should be handled from the bench: innovators, are the judges who feel 
obliged to make law when the opportunity presents itself, interpreters believe that judicial 
lawmaking should be held to a minimum, and realists are the judges in the middle who 
are both judicially creative and good at showing restraint. 
To better understand how a judge's role orientation works and what factors affect 
them. Gibson (1977) examined judges' levels of judicial activism. It should be noted 
that this idea of activism is related to lower court judges and not those of the Supreme 
Court. Using this idea, it becomes more apparent that the law is usually only one of 
many criteria used in the process of decision-making. Other criteria tend to be non-legal 
factors such as the location of where the case originated or whether the claimant is a 
criminal or an alleged criminal. Gibson finds that, those judges who are more likely to be 
activists are those that tend to rate the importance of precedent relatively low in their 
decision-making, and thus, relied more on non-legal factors. This suggests that role 
orientation is related to the used of non-legal stimuli when the judge is in an activist role. 
Gibson (1980) next looks at judicial roles by separating them into two groups. He 
does this by examining the environmental factors that tend to affect those lower court 
judges, which do not have the luxury of lifetime appointment. Role orientation, in this 
case, affects a judges' behavior by influencing the way in which they determine 
procedures. Thus, instead of just using the law to make their decision, Gibson explains 
that the process is the object of these orientations and therefore helps predict the degree 
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of influence environmental factors (i.e. being elected and owing favors versus being 
appointed) might have on the decision-making process. These factors tend to produce 
two "roles" that a judge will fall into: the delegate and the trustee. The delegate, actively 
seeks out cues from their environment therefore, they tend to take account local 
environmental political influences, such as local political culture, in their decision-
making process. Those that assume the trustee role orientation, which are most federal 
judges, are the opposite of the delegate. This group tends to ignore environmental clues 
and focus instead on their own opinions, rather than what the constituents want. 
Another study by Gibson (1981) examines why judges make the decisions and 
adopted the role orientations that they do. More specifically the role of self-esteem in 
judicial decision-making is used to determine if there is any connection to the rulings 
these men and women make. Those with higher levels of self-esteem are the ones that 
tend to take a more activist role. Those with lower self-esteem on the other hand are more 
strongly influenced by these outside factors. Because of this, if the judge socializes with 
those that would view a particular decision as unacceptable, then these judges do not 
have the necessary ego to go against the grain. Thus, these men and women are much 
more likely to perform their duties in a role that is more subservient to those they believe 
they are there to serve. 
Chevron and the Two-Step Test 
While judicial review can come in different forms, precedent has considerable 
sway over the successive decisions judges makes from the bench. A precedent is an 
opinion that establishes a legal principle that must be followed by lower courts when they 
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are faced with similar legal issues. Not all cases are equally influential. One such case -
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984), - has the potential 
to be extremely influential, having been cited over 6300 times.3This landmark decision 
established a two-step test for judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes and 
also sparked a debate that continues on to this day (Kerr, 1998). Before understanding 
the debate involved on the outcome however, one must first understand the case itself. 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19774, the Environmental 
Protection Agency issued new rules regarding how air polluters would receive permits. 
Prior to the rule change, all sources of air pollution had to have their own permit. Thus, 
each smokestack for a factory would have to receive its own permit. The new rule 
allowed states to treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same group, as if they 
were encased in a single "bubble," and thus requiring only one permit be issued. The 
D.C. Circuit Court ruled that this was an incorrect interpretation of the statute, while the 
petitioner, Chevron USA, Inc. argued that this decision was in fact a reasonable 
construction of the statutory term "stationary source," as spelled in the 1977 amendments. 
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed and thus the decision was reversed. This 
was the birth of what is now known as the Chevron two-step test. 
In the majority opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, establishes the analysis that 
lower courts shall follow when a similar question is brought before them. Stevens stated 
when an agency's interpretation of statute is in dispute, courts should first ask the 
question of whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue. If Congress' intent is clear 
2467 U.S. 837. 
3 See the Pierce Law Library http://blogs.law.unh.edu/library/2009/02/50-most-
cited-us-supreme-court.html. 
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401. 
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and unambiguous, then the Court will determine whether the agency complied with 
Congress's desires. However, if the language in the statute is vague, or if Congress has 
not spoken directly to the question at hand, then the reviewing court can only overturn the 
agency's interpretation of statute if it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
language of the statute. These two steps are what should be used when deciding whether 
or not an agency is acting within the confines of the duties Congress has set them. Thus, 
in instances when a statute is not clear, an agency is largely free to adopt its own 
interpretation. 
Although seemingly straightforward in its application, the C7zevro«Two-Step (as 
it has come to be known) is not automatic. Thus individual judges may defer to an 
agency's interpretation more or less based on how readily they perceive ambiguity in 
statutory text. In fact, Orin Kerr (1998) developed three models that try to explain how 
Chevron is perceived and used by judges (Kerr, 1998). Each of these models is 
conceptually different. As Kerr explains, they each present a jurisprudential paradigm 
where a particular set of factors alters the chances of whether the reviewing court will 
uphold the agency interpretation of statutory law. 
In his 1998 article "Shedding LightonChevron" Kerr employs the three models — 
the political model, the interpretive model, and the contextual model — to describe how 
courts apply the Chevron doctrine. Kerr looks at cases decided in 1995 and 1996 decided 
in the U.S. Court of Appeals to test the model's explanatory power. He explains that 
each model offers something different, although their foci are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Instead, they can be combined to explain patterns of judicial outcomes 
because there is rarely only one set of factors influencing the outcomes of Chevron cases. 
15 
The Contextual Model 
Kerr's first model is the contextual model. In this model Kerr posits that cases 
involving agency interpretation of statute will continue to be guided by traditional 
methods of judicial review of agency actions, regardless of what the Chevron test dictates. 
He points to legal observers that prefer the traditional methods of reviewing agency 
decisions that were in place before the 1984 Chevron decision(see Breyerl986; Byse, 
1988). According to the contextual model, certain factors will continue to determine 
judges' deference in the post-Chevron era (Kerr, 1998). These original factors allowed a 
court to keep their authority to declare law while still respecting the judgment of the 
agency under review (Merrill, 1992). These factors includewhether an agency's 
construction was longstanding (i.e., if the agency adopted the interpretation many years 
ago), if the agency was consistent in its interpretation over time, whether the agency 
based their interpretation on expertise, whether the construction would expand agency 
influence, and whether or not Congress was aware of what the agency was doing and 
expressly declined to take action against them. 
Stephen Breyer (1986) originally explained in an article he wrote before coming 
to the Supreme Court, Chevron does not fit well with a judge performing his duty when 
reviewing an agency's actions, as too many complex questions may arise for a single rule 
to provide an answer. Because of this, it seems unlikely that the doctrine will replace 
these traditional factors of review. 
Thomas Merrill (1992) is similarly a traditionalist. He believes that the traditional 
factors that gave rise to the modern administrative state - such as agencies' need for 
flexibility, respect for their expertise, and their need to exercise freely discretionary 
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authority — do a much better job of explaining how constitutional and legal frameworks 
relate to the ordinary modes of judicial interpretation. Hence, the political model 
provides a greater amount of authority to those with more expertise because judges 
realize that they are limited in their knowledge of most agency actions. This model also 
puts emphasis on whether an agency's interpretation has been longstanding and 
consistent. The better (or at least longer) the agency interprets the statute, the more likely 
it is to be upheld in the courts. 
Another proponent of employing traditional factors injudicial interpretation is 
Abner Mikva (1986) who served on the United States Court of Appeals. His argument is 
that there is a clear distinction between complying with an agency's interpretation and 
following well-established principles of deference. It is important to note that Chevron is 
not applicable to all cases in which an agency has adopted an interpretation of a statute on 
which Congress has been silent or ambiguous. This is because judges do not always have 
the technical expertise needed to make decisions in these cases. Therefore, the Court 
should rely on its ability to determine Congress' intent using the traditional tools of 
construction, whatever those may be. Only when this method has failed to discern 
Congress' intent should Chevron's two-step be applied. As Mikva explains, this is 
especially true when one considers that Justice Stevens, author of the Chevron opinion, 
has stated that the analysis does not establish an absolute rule of deference, a blow indeed 
to those that believe in the absoluteness of the doctrine.5 
Maureen Callahan (1991) asks if federal courts even need to defer to the 
interpretations of agencies in the first place. She believes that the Chevron decision is, in 
5 See Stevens opinion in the case of Bowen v. American Hospital Association (1986) 
476 U.S. 610. 
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part, unconstitutional. When explaining the decision in light of the separation of powers 
doctrine, Callahan argues that the decision is inconsistent because it views the deference 
requirement as constitutionally mandated, which is not the case. Rather she argues that 
this deference disrupts the separation of powers balance by conflicting with Article III 
and thus one must wonder if the doctrine is wholly appropriate to use in place of the 
traditional factors. More specifically, if a court is bound to adopt an agency's 
interpretation rather than doing so at its own discretion the duty of the judiciary, which is 
to say what the law is, breaks down. Because of this, Callahan believes that in the place 
of always applying deference, courts should recognize that some policy choices are better 
made by the political branches. However,Chevron's deference should not automatically 
follow statutory ambiguity or silence, but instead should be employed only when 
circumstances warrant its use, which would be only when an agency has seriously 
overstepped its legal bounds. 
As a group, these observers are traditionalists. Because of this, they prefer that the 
traditional factors over doctrine established in the fairly recently decided Chevron case. 
Thus a judge who follows this model may do his or her best to avoid applying or even 
mentioning Chevron when an agency action is under review. Rather, they would use 
only the traditional factors when making their decisions. As a result, judges who adopt 
this method of interpretation would instead favor the more traditional factors when 
deciding Chevron-type cases. 
The Political Model 
Kerr's (1998) political model examines how a judge applies Chevron by 
determining whether their personal orientation affects their decision-making process. It 
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draws from the attitudinal model and the belief that a judge votes the way he/she does 
because they lean further to one side of the political spectrum. Those that believe in this 
model find that the best predictor, of a judge, giving deference to the doctrine is his or her 
political attitude (Kerr, 1998). The idea of political preferences impacting judicial 
opinions is not a new one, as Cohen and Spitzer (1994) explain, judge's prefer to involve 
themselves in both administrative procedures and policy outcomes. 
This view of the role of political preferences injudicial opinions, leads to two 
empirical claims (see Jordan 1989; Pierce 1995; and Vaughns 1995). First is the 
assertion that the inclination, of a judge to apply Chevron, depends on the level of 
political agreement they share with the administration's rule that is under review (Cohen 
and Spitzer 1994). For example, during the Reagan era, judges that were proponents of 
the current administration tended to approve of Chevron, while their opponents were 
critical of the doctrine. The second claim is the belief that a judge is making decisions 
strategically, which reflects their political ideologies (Pierce, 1995). In other words, a 
liberal judge will attempt to reach liberal outcomes in order to further their liberal agenda. 
Chevron would come into play, in this type of situation, because when reviewing agency 
decisions, a judge has the chance to affect policy decisions. 
Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy (1995) also ascribe to the tenets political model. 
As they explain, in administrative law, judicial review allows a judge to intervene when 
an agency decision conflicts with the beliefs they hold and also to defer when the 
decision falls in line with them. Thus the application, of Chevron, or the lack thereof 
helps in the determination of those manipulable categories to which different degrees of 
deference apply. It is of interest to note that the authors actually argue that judges not 
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apply Chevron because it is too determinant and thus in their best interest to avoid the 
application. In other words, they believe that a judge's decisions could more easily 
reflect their orientation by using a more indeterminate method when handing down a 
ruling. 
The Interpretive Model 
While the third model does not fall into the scope of this study, it is still important 
to the study of Chevron and therefore should be discussed in part. The interpretive model 
is the more naive sounding of the three because this posits that judges apply the two-step 
test as objectively as possible, and that they are governed by the language of the test and 
nothing else (Kerr, 1998). The general method used by intrepretivists is textualism, 
which means that they seek statutory meaning in the language of the statutory text itself 
without using outside, non-textual sources. Adherents to this approach argue that the 
impact of the Chevron deference, to textualism, is less deference, a view held by Justice 
Antonin Scalia (Maggs, 1996). These judges will find plain meaning in the statute they 
are reviewing, which allows them to ignore an agency's expert judgment and base their 
decision based on what they believe the text of the statute to mean (Mank, 1996). 
Much like the political model, this model has two related empirical claims that 
help explain how it works. The first is best explained by Gregory Maggs (1996). Maggs 
took the idea that textualist judges accept executive interpretations at a different rate than 
non-texualists and applied it to the voting records of Justice Antonin Scalia. What he 
found was that Scalia accepted and rejected agency interpretations of statutes atalmost 
equal amounts to agency interpretation rates. This indicates that his preference for 
textualism does not lead him to defer more or less than the other non-textualist Justices. 
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The second claim, whose primary proponent is Thomas Merrill (1994), states that 
textualist judges are much less likely to apply deference doctrines, such as Chevron, than 
their non-textualist counterparts. Merrill's study examines legislative history and 
Supreme Court applications of Chevron. He asserts that, as time progressed, there would 
be a decreasing use of legislative history and thus an increase in textualism, which would 
correspondingly lead to a decrease in the number of Chevron and related deference 
doctrine applications. Merrill believes that as statutes become increasingly complex, the 
Court's will allow more and more deference, under Chevron, that is based on agency 
expertise rather than legislative history. What he finds is as the 1980s progress, the Court 
relies less on legislative history, which he interprets to mean that there is a decreasing 
reliance upon deference principles. 
While the interpretive model is interesting, as stated before it does not fall within 
the scope of this study. The very fact that it has more to do with textualism and proving 
that a judge is using Chevron exactly as it was meant to be, without any outside 
influences (such as pleasing constituencies), is much harder to prove.6Therefore, it would 
be best to focus on the remaining two models, which have also been discussed. 
Hypotheses 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how judges use Chevron in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals (further details about the methodology will be provided below). 
I am trying to determine which model, political or contextual, best explains the use of 
6 As an indicator of a judge's textualism, Kerr used whether George H. W. Bush or 
Ronald Reagan appointed a judge, which is not a good measure of this. When one 
looks only at the appointing president and not at the way in which a judge applies 
citations there is a large room for error. 
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Chevron. I test six hypotheses. Each hypothesis deals with the issues mentioned 
previously. 
Hypothesis one tests the contextual model. This model states that the older a rule 
the more likely it is to be upheld by a judge because the traditional methods put in place 
before the ruling on Chevron should carry more weight than the doctrine itself. 
Hi: Longstanding interpretations, rules that are more than 30 years old, are more 
likely to be upheld at a consistent rate compared to newer rules. 
Hypothesis two is a test of the political model, informed by strategic new 
institutionalism. These models state that the political orientation of a judge and how they 
believe their job should be performed influences the decisions they make while on the 
bench. 
H2: Republican judges will be more likely to uphold rules generated during 
Republicanadministrations and Democratic judges will be more likely to uphold 
rulesgenerated by Democratic administrations. 
Hypotheses three, four, five, and six examine components of the political model. 
Since attitudinalists argue that political orientations are what influence a judge the most, 
there would tend to be a noticeable difference between the rulings of judges that are 
conservative and those that are liberal. 
H3: Republican judges will come to a conservative outcome more often than a 
liberal one. 
H4: Democratic judges will come to a liberal outcome more often than a 
conservative one. 
In hypotheses five and six I test whether the party of the president, when a rule 
22 
was adopted, was a factor in a judge's decision-making process. This is because a 
judge's partisan affiliation does matter, as strategic new institutionalism asserts. I believe 
that a judge does act strategically when making decisions and therefore if they want to 
further a particular political orientation then any rules set forth by an appointing president 
from the opposite party will be struck down. The strategy here is for a judge to find a 
way to further the political agenda that they are sympathetic to. If a conservative judge 
sees that a rule was set forth by a conservative president then they will be more likely to 
find ambiguity at step one in order to further that conservative viewpoint. 
H5: Judges appointed by a Republican president will be more likely to allow 
agency rules at step one compared to their Democratic counterparts for rules 
generated during Republican presidential administrations. 
H6: Judges appointed by Democratic president will be more likely to allow agency 
rules at step one compared to their Republican counterparts for rules generated 
during Democrat presidential administrations. 
The following section will present the findings of my research and explain the processes 
used when gathering the data. 
Data Collection 
This section provides an overview of where the data came from as well as an 
explanation of my hypotheses. I will then present my findings and explain the relevance 
of Chevron in today's Ninth Circuit district courts. 
7 For a reference on how the data was coded see Appendix B. 
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The study presented was designed to test the contextual and political models of 
Chevron while simultaneously testing whether thepolitical orientation of a judge could be 
determined when it comes to judicial review. Therefore, the test results should show that 
a judge would decide to defer or not defer based on the outcome, either liberal or 
conservative, that they are hoping for. 
A search of cases was conducted that were decided by U.S. district courts in the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2008 and 2009 that used the Chevron test on an 
agency's interpretation of statute .The search rendered a total of 89 instances when a 
district court judge cited Chevron. In this instance, I restricted my search to only 2008 
and 2009 because of limited time and resources. However, it should be noted that in 
most instances legal research does not include quantitative data in any form. While there 
are times when data is introduced in legal research, these scholars tend to focus on a 
much smaller number of cases (usually between one and five)to explain what they are 
saying because they are much more interested in what a precedent is saying rather than 
explaining how it is being applied to the world outside of the law. Therefore, the fact that 
I have included such research and a larger number of cases helps to strengthen the 
research that I conducted. Additionally, I am updating the 1998 work of Orin Kerr, 
which used a similar method when choosing cases for the research conducted. This way I 
could reproduce his work albeit on a smaller scale. 
Ninth Circuit cases were used because that circuit it is the largest district in the 
country and provided the largest number of Chevron citations. My analysis was 
restricted to cases decided in one circuit to limit any inter-circuit variation of Chevron's 
8 For a comprehensive list of cases see Appendix A. 
24 
application. The problem with this variation is that each circuit can use a citation in a 
different way because there are different statutes in effect. Therefore, while Chevron 
citations may be used in similar cases, the circuit it is cited in affects how they are used. 
While this is in no way a bad thing, I thought that as a starting point it would be best to 
restrict the cases to one district, though this idea of variation is something that I would 
like to revisit in the future.I also focused on the Ninth circuit because it has the reputation 
of having very liberal judges. Thus, with this reputation I believed that it would be a 
good place to test whether the party of a judge truly does make a difference when they 
are handing down decisions from the bench. More specifically using the attitudinal and 
political models to determine if there are more liberal decisions coming from a supposed 
liberal circuit, which would be what one would expect. 
A judges' party affiliation was collected from the biographies provided by the 
Ninth Circuit Court.9 Data were also collected on the age of the rule challenged via the 
Lexis Nexis Academic Premier. In order to determine whether a judge was a Republican 
or Democrat, I looked at the party of the president that appointed the judge in questions. 
As to the definition of whether the judge themselves were liberal or conservative, I 
examined the text of the outcome of each case the judge decided and used Orin Kerr's 
assessment to determine whether the holding made would be considered liberal or 
conservative. For example, any case where the causes of environmental protection, 
immigration, entitlement benefits, government regulation of business, and employees 
rights against employees were furthered, were considered liberal decisions. Decisions 
that impeded the aforementioned causes were considered conservative. 
9 See http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/ninthcircuit/circuit_judges.html. 
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Results 
As Table 1 shows, there were eight types of cases that cited Chevron, with the 
largest percentage of them dealing with penal immigration, and environmental legislation, 
together comprising nearly two-thirds of the cases examined. The remaining cases dealt 
with various other kinds of legislation dealing with employment and economic legislation, 
Medicare/Medicaid, and other types of entitlement statutes. Five cases involved states 
challenging an agency's interpretation of federal legislation. One case could not be 
categorized.10 
Table 1: 
Type of Cases that Apply Chevron 


































To test the contextual model, data were collected on when the rules that were 
challenged in the cases was adopted in order to see if agencies' interpretations of older 
rules were more likely to be upheld by reviewing courts. The reason for this being that 
the contextual model asserts that the traditional methods in place before Chevron 
10 The one case that could not be categorized had too many different elements to pin 
down only one specific category in which to place it. 
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determine how judges will use the Chevron test. Specifically, judges will give more 
deference to agencies' interpretation of older, more established rules. 
Table 2: 





































As Table 2 shows, the largest number of challenged rules came from the 1980s, 
with the 1970s in a close second. Table 3tests Hi and presents data showing the 
acceptance rate of a regulation (the number of times judges uphold particular rules) in 
relation to the length of time that regulation has been in effect. Since 30 years was the 
mean age, I thought it best for that number to be the cutoff in this particular case.The 
table shows that rules 30 years or older, are upheld less often than those that are younger 
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than 30 years. It should be noted that this table runs counter to the contextual model's 
prediction as it says that the older a rule the more likely it is to be upheld.Judges were 
less likely to defer to older, more established rules and more likely to defer to less-
longstanding ones. 
The political model posits a judge will be more likely to reach a decision that 
reflects his or her own political beliefs. As Table 4 shows, while testing H2, H3, and H4 
this is not necessarily the case. Republican judges presided over 27 cases and came to a 
conservative decision 59% of the time, while coming to a liberal decision only 41% of 
the time, which appears to agree with the proposed hypothesis. However, Democratic 
judges presided over 39 cases and came to a conservative decision 54% of the time, 
leaving only a small margin between them and their Republican colleagues. Democratic 
judges also only came to a liberal decision 46% of the time. After running a Person's 
chi-square to determine whether this was a significant difference in the direction of the 
two groups' decisions, it would seem that, while conservatives are slightly more likely to 
reach a conservative decision, there is, in fact, no statistically significant difference 
between the two groups in how they decide a case. 
Table 4: 

















I also examined whether or not conservatives and liberals were more likely to rule 
a particular way when dealing with a certain issue (immigration, environmental, etc.). 
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Tables 5 and 6 show these outcomes. There is a tendency, in some areas, for a judge to 
show his or her political orientations. For example, when the matter of states against a 
federal regulation occurs, conservative judges reach a conservative decision 60% of the 
time and when a liberal judge is confronted with employment issues they reach a liberal 
decision 50% of the time. This behavior is not consistent across the board however, as 
conservatives reach a conservative opinion 23% of the time and liberals reach a liberal 
decision 22% of the time. 
Table 5: 
Cases that Lead to a Conservative Result 



































Cases that Lead to a Liberal Result 


































Presidential Party and Allowance Found at Chevron Step One 




Number of Chevron Cases 
45 
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To get a sense of whether the political orientations of judges impact how likely 
they are to differ to agencies' interpretations, the party of the judge (or at least the 
president who appointed them) was crosstabulated in Table 7. The table shows, there is a 
difference between Democratic and Republican judges when allowing step one. 




Party of President When Rule was Adopted and Allowance of Step 1 
% Step 1 allowed by 
Republican Judges 
% Step 1 allowed by 
Democratic Judges 







Table 8 tests H5 and H6 and determines whether a judge is more likely to uphold a 
rule when they agree with the party of the president when the rule was adopted. 
Republicans tend to allow step one more often when it means upholding a conservative 
decisions, whereas Democratic judges tend to uphold conservative administration rules 
more often than liberal ones. These findings disprove both hypothesis five and 
hypothesis six. Neither conservative nor liberal judges allow step one significantly more 
often when it means upholding a similar ideology. 
Conclusion 
This study set out to prove which model, the contextual or the political, of 
Chevron was the most applicable while simultaneously testing whether thepolitical 
orientation of a judge could be determined when it comes to judicial review. This study 
was important because the question of whether how a judge is making his decisions is 
one that is of great interest to those that study the law and courts. Finding whether a 
11 For the results in this table two separate chi-squares were run. The first reflects 
the distribution for republican judges only of allowances rate cross-tabulated with 
the party of the president when the rule was adopted. For this table chi-
square=.025 and p= .873. The second was for democratic judges only and the chi-
square equals 2.90 and p=.09 
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judge applies his orientation rather than facts and the law is a question that should be 
answered in order to keep our legal system in check. 
As Kerr (1998) found, the political model does seem to offer the most explanation 
when attempting to explain how a judge makes their decisions, but this does not seem to 
be the case in this instance. As Table 3 shows the older interpretations challenged before 
the Ninth Circuit's district courts were not upheld at a higher rate. This is relevant 
because it gives evidence that the contextual model is not reliable as a model for Chevron, 
in this case. At the same time however, there was no significance found in the tables that 
test the political model either. While there are instances of Republican judges showing a 
slight favoritism towards conservative outcomes it does not prove that the political model 
is superior in this case. Kerr's models were not the only ones to show a lack of 
significance in this study however. The behavioral models (attitudinal, strategic new 
institutionalism, etc.) were also disproved in this instance, which is surprising. Perhaps 
in the future the idea of role theory should be included in the study as well to gain a more 
complete perspective and to further the study conducted here. 
In this case, the findings were the exact opposite of what I expected to find. At 
present, what the tests conducted do indicate is that the alternate explanation, that the 
Chevron precedent is being used, as it should be, is in fact the case. Judges are not using 
it to make policy but instead are using this application only when they deem it necessary 
to further the rule of law. Therefore, the argument that this precedent is merely a 
revolution on paper does not seem to be a proper concern. Judges are applying Chevron 
as it was meant to be, which is when an agency has or has been accused of overstepping 
the administrative bounds set forth by Congress. 
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At the same time the concern that judicial oversight might be curbed does not 
seem plausible either. Judicial review is not threatened by the application of Chevron 
rather it is strengthened by it. Because, when used correctly, the doctrine allows the 
judiciary to review agency actions and determine whether they acted within their bounds 
or arbitrarily and capriciously and as this study shows, Chevron is used correctly, in the 
Ninth Circuit at least. 
Further study is needed before the argument that judges are political players can 
be completely denied however, at the time the findings show that they are not. Future 
research should look at the weaknesses of this study to help make the information 
presented here more useful. In particular, an expansion of the number of years, cases and 
inter-circuit variation studied in order to have a more accurate picture of the judiciary as a 
whole would be the best place to start. After all, how one district operates cannot be 
applied to the whole of the United States. For now however, one can hold onto the belief 
that justice and the law are still pure from the stain of the political game. 
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1 =Johnson 5=Reagan 
2=Nixon 6=Bush Sr. 
3=Ford7=Clinton 





1 =entitlement benefits 6=economic matter 
2=immigration 7=states against federal regulation 
3=environmental 8=penal 






S tep l Allowed 
l=judge finds Congress did not speak clearly 
0=judge finds Congress did speak clearly 
Step_2_Allowed 
l=judge finds Congress did not speak clearly and agency was reasonable in its 
application 
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1 =if upholding rule leads to a conservative outcome 
O îf upholding rule leads to a liberal outcome 
Text of Outcome 
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